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RECENT DECISIONS

gage because rates for transportation may be directly affected by the
degree of the carrier's responsibility for safe carriage and delivery of
baggage. Under this reasoning posted tariff regulations which in any
way directly limited the amount of money which the carrier could be
called upon to pay out would seem to be matter notice of which the
passenger would properly be held to have. Regulations pertaining to
obligatory routing of passengers or manner of baggage disposition
might conceivably be included in this category. Situations are various
and many. A regulation, however, limiting the time in which an action
might be commenced appears too remote in its effect on the carrier's
rates and charges to reasonably charge a passenger of notice thereof in
the manner undertaken in the instant case. Nor can it be said to be a
matter contemplated or required by the Interstate Commerce Act to be
filed under tariff regulations. The law as pronounced in the present
case would seem to allow the carrier to attach unusual limitations and
conditions, both subsequent and precedent, to the unsuspecting passengers' contract of carriage by merely including them on the posted list
of tariff regulations. This hardly seems desirable.
The case of Pacific SS Co. v. Cackett5 presented a fact situation
similar to the one here discussed. The Court there held specifically that
because giving of notice of claims for damages from negligence had
no perceptible relation to rates and charges for transportation, the
plaintiff did not lose her right of action by failure to comply with carrier's regulation pertaining thereto. This case was not cited in the
opinion of the present case.
PATRICIA MAHONEY

Evidence- Scope of Cross-Examination of Juror Witness to Events
in Jury Room -One
Burton was on trial for income tax evasion.
LaBranche was called as a juror, examined, accepted, heard the evidence and thereafter was sent to the jury room where he deliberated
with his fellow jurors as to the verdict. The result was a disagreement
and the jury was discharged. This was followed by a criminal action
charging LaBranche and others with conspiracy in that for a sum of
money LaBranche promised to vote for the acquittal of Burton.
The prosecution called Adams who had served as a petit juror
with LaBranche, and asked how LaBranche had voted. Adams answered LaBranche had voted for acquittal throughout the entire proceedings in the jury room. On cross-examination counsel for LaBranche asked Adams how the other jurors had voted. The government
objected on grounds of immateriality and irrelevancy, and was sus5 Supra, Npte 3.
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tained by the Court. On appeal defendant contended the limitation on
his right of cross-examination was prejudicial, because if Adams had
been permitted to answer the question, it would have been shown that
not only had LaBranche voted for acquittal, but seven other jurors also
voted the same way. Held: In the prosecution of a juror for conspiracy
to impede the administration of justice, where it is testified that
the juror voted not guilty throughout the proceedings of the jury, that
on cross-examination because of juror's privilege it would be improper
to ask how the other particular jurors voted. Conviction was sustained.
Burton v. United States, 175 F. (2d) 960 (C.C.A. 5th 1949).
It is settled with apparent unanimity that the activities and deliberations transpiring in the jury room are cloaked with a definite sanctity
and privilege.' Except in those countries where a tryannical form of
government exists, the courts will not permit a prying into the jury
room to ascertain how the jurors voted in arriving at the verdict. For
reasons of public policy the utmost freedom of debate and protection
from impertinent exposure of the arguments and ballots of the jurors
must be upheld.

2

Admitted such sanctity and inviolability does exist, yet it is conceded
the privilege takes as its postulate a genuine relation, honestly created
and honestly maintained.3 In other words, although a juror is protected
from a disclosure of his activities in the jury room, this immunity may
be obliterated when prima facie evidence is produced showing he acted
corruptly. 4 Thus if it be shown the juror rendered untrue statements
on his examination as to his qualifications as a juror, or that he accepted
a bribe, or that he propositioned other jurors to acquit the defendant,
the courts will then permit the jury room door to be opened for the
purpose of gathering corrobative evidence.5
In holding that the testimony of Adams as to how the other jurors
voted was irrelevant and immaterial, the reasoning behind the Court's
ruling ostensibly was based on the idea that jurors should be afforded
sanctity. This doctrine has its roots in an old English case where
at the seige of Minorca in 1755. The British public was profoundly
jarred at the death sentence imposed on the Admiral, and immediately
set up a vociferous clamor for an investigation of those who had rendered the verdict. In refusing to investigate the doings of the triers, the
House of Lords concluded that for the sake of administering criminal
justice satisfactorily, a disclosure of the reasoning of those who pronounced the verdict could not be made public.6
'Columbus Oil Co. v. Moore, 202 N.C. 708, 163 S.E. 879 (1932).
2 Carpenter v. Carpenter, 48 R.I. 56, Atl. 322 (1926).
3 Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 535 S.Ct. 465, 77 L.Ed. 933 (1933).
4 Ibid.
5 Matter of Cochran, 237 N.Y. 336, 143 N.E. 212 (1924).
6 Campbell, Lives of the Lord Chancellors, Vol. V. Chapter 136, p. 141.
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This principle as stated cannot be controverted. Query whether
there should be strict adherence to such a policy once the door to the
jury room has been unlatched? More precisely, should one party be
allowed to invade the sanctity of the jury room, obtain the evidence it
desires, and then close the door and exclude the opposition from securing evidence from the same source which may be favorable to him?
By analogy it is found that the law abounds with privileges, immunities, and privacies accorded in particular relationships existing between parties. Thus there is a privilege protecting communications
between attorney and client. 7 There is a privilege extended the doctorpatient relationships As between husband and wife both are precluded
from testifying against the other in matters classed as private and confidential communications. 9 A defendant or any witness may refuse to
answer questions which are of a self-incriminating nature.1 0 For each
and every privilege there is a distinct reason, which usually may be
summed up by stating that as between the parties there exists a natural
confidence, and there must be no apprehension that such confidence will
be violated. Yet, in each and every case, this privilege may be waived
and thrown to the winds by the parties themselves either by breaking
the seal of secrecy by their own testimony,"1 by failing to properly object when the privilege is invaded, 2 or by probing the party beyond
the limits of the privilege. 13 In short, the veil is draped shrouding the
events and words from disclosure for reasons of confidence, respect,
and harmony, providing the protected parties do not open the door.
Once the lid has been lifted, the privilege drops out of the picture, and
there is publicity.
From all this it seems apparent that the standards of American
justice and due process of law will not tolerate one party trespassing
in and out of the so-called private zone, and at the same time not allow
a similar opportunity to the other litigant. Whether the protected class
be a jury, the attorney-client, doctor-patient, should make no difference.
If on direct examination, the privilege is ignored and one party is permitted to extricate evidence from a source in the protected category,
the fundamental right of the opposition insists that cross-examination
pursuing the same avenue must be accorded that party.' 4 When such
cross-examination is abbreviated and cut short, it is obvious the rulings
7

Matters v. State, 120 Neb. 404, 232 N.W. 781 (1930); Orton v. McCord, 32
205 (1873).
Maine v. Maryland Casualty Co., 172 Wis. 350, 178 N.W. 749, 15 A.L.R. 1536

8 Wis.

(1920).
9 Sexton v. Sexton, 129 Iowa 487, 105 N.W. 314 (1905) ; 2 LRA NS 708.
10 United States v. Benjamin, 120 F. (2d) 521 (C.C.A. 2d 1941).
"1People v. Gosch, 82 Mich. 22, 46 N.W. 101 (1890).
12Burke v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 131 Minn. 209, 154 N.W. 960 (i917).
13 In Re Coleman's Will, 111 N.Y. 220, 19 N.E. 71 (1888).
'4 Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 51 S.Ct. 218, 75 L.Ed. 624 (1931).
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of the court may be partial, one-sided, and give an advantage to the
sustaining party. To say jurors must be insured freedom of action, and
at the same time open the door for one side and not for the other, seems
too high a price to pay for the assurance to jurors of serenity of mind.
VINCENT A. VASSALLO
Torts - Remedy of Personal Representative for the Wrongful Death
of an Unborn Child -Beatrice
Verkennes, mother of the deceased
child and wife of the plaintiff, engaged defendant physician to take
care of her during pregnancy and the delivery of her child. While at
the hospital defendant allegedly was negligent in properly aiding, treating, and caring for her during her confinement, and that by reason
thereof the foetus died undelivered. Held: under a wrongful death
statute, the personal representative of an unborn child alleged to be
viable and capable of separate and independent existence, whose death
was caused by the negligence of the physician in charge of the mother,
may maintain an action therefor on behalf of the next of kin of such
deceased child. Verkennes v.Cornieaet aL., 38 N.W. (2d) 838, (Minn.,
1949).
There is a conflict of authority on the issue whether the special administrator for the unborn child has a cause of action on behalf of the
unborn child. The majority of jurisdictions follow the early case of
Dietrich v. Inhabitantsof Northampton.' Justice Holmes there maintained that a child en ventre sa mere has no juridical existence, and is
so intimately united with its mother as to be a "part" of her and as a consequence is not to be regarded as a separate, distinct, and individual entity. The reasoning thus expressed follows the common law.2 In an
Illinois case plaintiff's mother, ten days before being confined, negligently was injured in defendant's elevator. Plaintiff, who was born
four days later, was also negligently injured. The State has an unlawful death statute, but in denying recovery to the child the opinion read:
"That a child before its birth is in fact, a part of the mother, and
is only severed from her at birth, cannot, we think, be successfully disputed. The doctrine of the civil law and the ecclesiastical and admiralty courts, therefore, that an unborn child may be
regarded as in esse for some purposes, when for its benefit, is a
mere legal fiction, which, so far as we have been able to discover,
has not been indulged in by courts of common law to the extent
of allowing an action by an infant for injuries occasioned before
its birth. If the action can be maintained, it necessarily follows
that an infant may maintain an action against its own mother for
injuries occasioned by the negligence of the mother while preg'3
nant with it. We are of the opinion that the action will not lie."
1138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884).
252 Am. Jur. 440, sec. 98.
3 Allaire v. St Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).

